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PROBLEMS OF A PSYCHIATRIST
IN OPERATING UNDER THE
M'NAGHTEN, DURHAM AND MODEL
PENAL CODE RULES*
JOHN R. CAVANAGH, M.D.**
Prior to July 1, 1954, there was very little of the confusion con-
cerning the legal responsibility of the mentally ill in criminal cases
which we have today. On that day the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia entered the practice of psychiatry with the
Durham Decision. This rule actually was a resurrection of an old New
Hampshire rule of 1870. The New Hampshire rule which was expressed
in almost identical terms as the Durham Rule, rested quietly in the
archives of its courts for almost 90 years, not being adopted by any other
state. Its revivication by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia was accompanied by the loud acclaim of a few lawyers, a few
psychiatrists, and a few judges. It was not then, and has not in the seven
years since, been accepted in any other jurisdiction and has been speci-
fically rejected by 20 states.
Desperate measures have been employed to keep life in this rule in
spite of the fact that attempts to employ it have resulted only in con-
fusion and legal loopholes. It has been referred to as "vague," "con-
fusing," "ambiguous" and "misleading."1 The decision itself was so
vague that the court felt compelled to issue in rapid succession a series
of clarifying decisions, none of which was very helpful. When no one
enthusiastically embraced this judicial attempt to legislate and when the
impractical aspects of the rule became glaringly apparent, we witnessed
the unbelievable spectacle of certain judges, leaving the bench and going
to the public platform and to the press in its defense.2 A matter such as
this is not a political issue with emotional overtones to be decided by
an appeal to the public. The question of the determination of the legal
responsibility of the mentally ill should be discussed quietly by experts
on the subject, and then recommendations made to the legislative
branches of government which are those branches in a democracy most
responsive to the people's will and "to the moral feelings of the com-
munity."
Public appearances of judges in defense of their decisions are not
* Presented as part of a Symposium on Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law
at Marquette University Law School.
** Doctor of Medicine, Washington, D.C.
Blocker v. United States, 288 F. 2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
2 Prettyman, The Problem of the Inconpetent, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 219
(1961).
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only inappropriate but are quite misleading.3 Other judges of the court
who prefer to express their opinions from the bench in the traditional
manner of judges may not reach the public with their opinions. This
leads to the erroneous opinion that all the judges on the court are in
agreement that because lawyers and psychiatrists will not cooperate, the
public is being deprived of the full value of the Durham Rule. Legisla-
tion is better handled by the elected representatives of the people rather
than by judicial legislation. Another aspect of the judicial handling of
the subject of criminal responsibility seems to be a developing senti-
mentality and emotionalism on the subject. Every right of the offender
should be protected, but in doing so we should not overlook the rights
and the need for protection of the rest of the citizens. The recent de-
cisions of some courts seem to overlook society's needs and show a
sentimental concern for the defendant. Perhaps what we need is a more
rational and less emotional approach to this problem. If I seem to speak
only of the Durham Rule it is because I practice in Washington where
we have been constantly exposed to its vagueness. For those who may
not be familiar with the wording of the Durham Rule, it is stated quite
simply in these words:
An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect.4
It is indeed a simple enough statement. Judge Prettyman, speaking
at Washington and Lee University, said it was plain, simple sense. "The
rule," he added, "is simple; it is direct; it is true; it is not novel or
startling."5 Everyone does not feel this way. For example, such opinions
as this are quite common in regard to the Durham Decision: "Observing
this, one writer concluded that 'Durham then puts forth, in my opinion,
a legal principle beclouded by a central ambiguity, both unexplained and
unsupported by its basic rationale.' The need in this area is for more
clarification, and the Durham instruction does not supply it. Judge
Learned Hand put it this way: 'I have read the opinion that you men-
tion, and perhaps it is all that can be said; but, frankly, it did not seem
to me to give us any guidance that perceptibly would help.'"6
To these statements may be added this statement from the concurring
opinion in the Blocker case:
One of the fallacies of the formulation of the "disease-product"
test of Durham v. United States, apart from its being stated in
terms unfamiliar to jurors, was the tacit assumption that the test
and the instruction to the jury could be stated "simply." It
3 Ibid.
4 Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
5 Prettyman, supra note 2, at 229.
6 Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Cases: The Durham Rule or the M'Naghten
Rule in Illinois, 1957 J.A.M.A. 1491.
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cannot be stated simply, because it is the most complicated, elu-
sive and difficult problem in the criminal law.7
This difference of opinion has led to some ill-considered statements.
For instance, a usually conservative judge made this comment:
Were it not tragic, it would be amusing, but the fact is that mostjudges and lawyers regard psychiatry as a sort of crystal gazing,
or a magician's trick show, with mumbo-jumbo incantations and
ladies suspended in air, all done with mirrors. 8
It is ridiculous to believe that any intelligent person in this day holds
this view about psychiatry.
But our purpose here is not to analyze the Judges of the Court of
Appeals, but to take a psychiatric look at the legal responsibility of the
mentally ill.
General Principles
Before discussing this subject more specifically, there are certain
general principles which must be recognized and discussed:
1. The Psychosomatic Unity of Man
2. The Psychic Structure
a. Cognition
b. Responsibility and Freedom of the Will
3. Causality and Productivity
4. Disease and Defect
Most important of all is this: Insanity is a legal, not a medical concept.
I shall state this as an axiom and shall not discuss it further.
The Psychosomatic Unity of Man
Man functions as a unit. What affects one aspect of his personality
affects all other parts. Physical illness and mental illness form a con-
tinuum. What is more important for our purpose is the fact that when
one aspect of the personality is affected, all other aspects of the per-
sonality are affected in a proportion related to the severity of the origi-
nal disturbance. For example, if there is a disturbance in cognition it
may be expected to affect volition, judgment, etc. When the Court in
the Durham Decision spoke of the knowledge of "right and wrong" as
being a symptom, they could have said quite correctly that in view of
the psychosomatic unity of man this knowledge was actually an integral
part of the disorder. The value of the "right and wrong" concept is that
the ethical sense is a more easily measurable aspect of the personality
than any other except intelligence. One cannot as accurately measure
affect, or imagination, or will, but we can measure ethical values, and
7 Blocker v. United States,supra note 1, at 871.8 Prettyman, supra note 2, at 233.
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estimate the accuracy of the individual's subjective evaluation of reality.
The Psychic Structure
For didactic purposes the personality must be described piece-meal,
but we should not picture it as a compartmented structure. It is actually
a functioning unit with a constant frictionless interchange between its
component parts. It is as if each component was a mirror which by its
reflection activates the other parts. As long as each mirror reflects its
proper degree of light in the right direction and with proper intensity
there is a normal interchange. If something happens to one or more of
the mirrors, it will disturb the whole mechanism. So it is with the
component parts of the mind.
As we view the personality in this frame of reference it becomes
clear:
1. That man functions as a unit;
2. That disturbances in one part of the personality can be expected
to produce a disturbance in all other parts;
3. That much of the mental functioning is in reference to a "par-
ticular act";
4. That the ethical sense is more easily measured than any other
aspect of the mental apparatus except intelligence;
5. In addition we must recognize that man possesses a freedom to
act or not to act.
The determination of the individual's knowledge of "right or wrong"
in regard to "the particular act" at the time he performed it is not a
symptom alone but a reaction of the total personality of the individual
who has been affected by mental illness. Each mental illness predomi-
nately affects one part of the personality. In the schizophrenic, for ex-
ample, it is the imagination, in the sociopathic personality it is the evalu-
ative function of the practical intellect. Time does not permit a dis-
cussion of this material at this time.
Cognition
This concept of the unity of the personality is important in view of
the loose thinking which has been prevalent in regard to the so-called
"right-wrong" test. When properly understood, it is a far more prac-
tical and workable test than the Durham Rule. We hear of the "Knowl-
edge Test." It is usually spoken of in a belittling way as if it were still
employed as it was in the days when a life sentence might be given for
the theft of a spoon or a loaf of bread. In days when evidence of
"knowledge" consisted of a statement by the pastor that the individual
had been taught it was wrong to steal. I believe that most psychiatrists
misunderstand the M'Naghten Rule which is more frequently referred
to today as the "Right-Wrong" test. It is implied that this test requires
only an abstract knowledge of right and wrong. This concept is in error.
1962]
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This rule is used in 31 states in each of which it is expressed somewhat
differently. The Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin, for example,
stated the rule in these terms:
The term insanity in the law means such an abnormal condition
of the mind from any cause, as to render the afflicted one in-
capable from distinguishing between right and wrong in the
given instance and so render him unconscious of the punishable
character of his act. [Emphasis supplied.]'
This reference to "in the given instance" follows the original M'-
Naghten Rule which was worded as follows:
The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the jury
on these occasions had generally been, whether the accused at
the time of doing the act knew the difference between right and
wrong; which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading to any mis-
take with the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when put
generally and in the abstract, as when put with reference to the
party's knowledge of right and wrong, in respect to the very
act with which he is charged.10
Those opposed to the use of the 'FNaghten Rule also feel that it is in
error because it emphasizes the cognitive and omits the volitional aspect
of man's nature. This statement is misleading because man functions as
a unit. Reason, will, feeling all coalesce and in the normal person are
integrated. What affects one part affects all other parts. What is more
important for our purpose is the fact that when one aspect of the per-
sonality is affected, all other aspects of the personality are affected in
a proportion related to the severity of the original disturbance.
Before accepting the opinion of those who scorn the "knowledge"
test, we must recognize that without knowledge there cannot be a free,
human act. As St. Augustine said long ago, Nil volitum quin prae-
cognitum."I On this point the distinction between conceptual cognition
and evaluative or deliberative cognition is important. This distinction
is seldom made by the opponents of the "knowledge test." Most of those
who speak of the "right and wrong" test seem to have in mind only
conceptual cognition.
Conceptual cognition expresses what the object of knowledge is.
Evaluative cognition expresses what importance or value it has to the
individual. Although most normal adults perceive both of these aspects
of cognition in the same act, neither factually nor conceptually do these
two cognitions express the same thing. They express diverse aspects of
the same object. These two aspects of cognition associated with a free
9 Kwosek v. State, 8 Wis. 2d 640, 100 N.W. 2d 339 (1960).
20 Quoted by John R. Cavanagh, Responsibility of the Mentally Il1, 4 CATHOLIC
LAW. 329, n. 28 (1958).
21 ST. AUGUSTINE, VIII DE GENERI AD LITTERAM 14, 32 (nothing can be willed
which is not first known.)
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will prepare the individual to perform a free, human act. It is likely
that the terms "nature and quality of the act" used in certain definitions
of the M'Naghten Rule are derived from these philosophical terms.
Conceptual cognition is almost always present. Even though one is
mentally ill or defective, his intellectual concept of a house remains that
of a house-if he sets fire to the house, he realizes that he is setting a
house on fire. Evaluative cognition is more subject to affective or
emotional influences and may be absent or defective for a number of
reasons, the most important of which for our present purpose is emo-
tional disturbance or mental illness. It is possible also that such evalu-
ative cognition may be present but the individual may pay no attention
to it. Father Ford gives this description:
A child of five years who sets fire to his father's hayloft, al-
though he has conceptual cognition both of the hayloft and the
fire, does not have evaluative cognition of the crime, that is the
objectively very serious violation of right order which he per-
petrates; and consequently this violation cannot be imputed to
him. He does have, however, both conceptual and evaluative
cognition of his act inasmuch as it is a wrongful childish deed,
and accordingly, in this respect his action is imputed to him and
is deserving of punishment. But an adult who posits the same
external act, generally has not only conceptual cognition, but
also evaluative cognition of the crime he commits, but he pays
no attention to it; because notwithstanding it he proceeds to the
commission of the crime, and therefore he should be fully ac-
countable for it.
Whenever a man, who because of his age is presumed to be
endowed with the power of sufficiently evaluating something, is
said nevertheless to have acted without sufficient evaluative cog-
nition, that can arise either from the fact that he did not want,
or from the fact that he was unable, to evaluate or weigh the
proposed action sufficiently. One who does not want to acquire
this knowledge will generally not escape either the subjective im-
putability or the objective obligatory force of his act, since he af-
fects ignorance, and it is hardly ever possible to discern whether
sufficient evaluative cognition was lacking-at least of a confused
and implicit kind. But one who is unable to evaluate at least the
substance of the proposed action, is obstructed in his natural
power of appreciation, either by an impediment which is merely
temporary and transitory (drunkenness, delirium, violent fever,
etc.) or by an habitual defect (whether congenital or acquired
during the course of his life); this type of habitual defect is
present in not a few mental diseases and psychic anomalies,
among which in recent times has been numbered so-called con-
stitutional immorality.
12
It is apparent, therefore, that when one speaks of cognition it in-
12John Ford, S.J., Criminal Responsibility in Canon Law and Catholic Thought,
3 BULLETIN OF THE GUILD OF CATHOLIC PSYCHIATRISTS 10-11 (1955).
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cludes also emotional and unconscious factors which help to contribute
to the evaluative or affective knowledge. Viewed in this way, it is ap-
parent that the "knowledge" test includes much more than mere con-
ceptual cognition.
Responsibility and Freedom of the Will
Responsibility results from the recognition by the average man that
he is answerable to a higher authority, whether parents, city, state, or
God, for approval or blame. Such answerability has no meaning unless
the individual is capable of earning reward or meriting blame; in other
words, unless he possesses a free will. Responsibility, as we have just
defined it, depends on free will as effect depends on cause. All men at
all times have recognized that culpability for a free act is a reality.
The subject of the freedom of the will is not a new one for lawyers.
For example, Mr. Justice Cardozo said that all law in Western civiliza
tion is:
... guided by a robust common sense which assumes the free-
dom of the will as a working hypothesis in the solution of legal
problems.13
And Mr. Justice Jackson in a similar vein said:
Whatever doubts (theologians, philosophers and scientists) have
entertained as to the matter, (of free will) the practical business
of government and administration of the law is obliged to pro-
ceed on more or less rough and ready judgments based on the
assumption that mature and rational persons are in control of
their own conduct.'4
In spite of the fact that the whole theory of the criminal law is based
on the idea of personal freedom to act or not to act, the author of the
Durham opinion at least implicitly denies it in an article in the Saturday
Evening Post, where he says:
Evil, of course, can only be punished or forgiven. But illness is
supposed to be ameliorated or cured. Thus the name we put to
our failures makes a difference. We all tend to believe in free
will when we entertain hopes for the future, but switch to de-
terminism when recalling our past failures. I suggest we extend
the same consideration to the failures of others.'5
It is important to have a clear understanding of the writer's definition
of free will. A prominent psychiatrist in a discussion with an associate
of mine, once remarked "How can you say that any man is free? Just
because I want to become a doctor doesn't mean that I can become one."
This clearly indicates a lack of correct understanding.
If an individual does not have this freedom to act or not to act, then
'3 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
14 Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, at 79-80 (1942).15 Bazelon, The Awesome Decision, Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 23, 1960, at
32-56.
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he should not be punished because the act of which he is guilty was not
his responsibility. It is on this theory that insanity is a defense in a
criminal case. It is considered that if the individual's concept of reality
is distorted to a sufficient extent that he acts on erroneous or false
premises which arise out of his mental illness that he is not responsible
for his act.
Responsibility does not mean "punishability." It means only that the
individual, whose responsibility is under examination, at the time he
performed a certain act or acts, was in such a state of mental health that,
barring external coercion, he was able to act freely on the basis of a
proper subject ve evaluation of his act or acts in accordance with ob-
jective reality. This is the evaluation which the psychiatrist is asked to
make. If, on the basis of this opinion, the individual is punished, it is a
separate action in which the psychiatrist plays no part.
This last statement requires further discussion. To be responsible
the individual must be able to distinguish subjective ideas of right and
wrong from the objective reality of right and wrong. In other words, a
person may judge subjectively that he was doing right whereas objec-
tively he was doing wrong. For example, a man may have the idea that
the speed limit on a highway was seventy miles per hour, whereas, if he
read the highway signs he would realize that the limit was fifty. If this
man were driving his car at sixty-five miles per hour, subjectively, he
would believe himself to be doing right whereas a highway patrolman
might catch up to him and tell him that he is breaking the law.
Responsibility for his act will be based upon the patient's subjective
judgment of himself as acting rightly or wrongly. But there is little
doubt that when reference is made to the Right and Wrong test of re-
sponsibility, the question of right and wrong here refers to the right
and wrong of the objective order. That is to say, the mentally ill man
has misapprehensions of objective reality, like our driver in the first
possibility. The presence of misrepresentations of reality does not in
itself relieve a man of responsibility. It would, however, if this misap-
prehension was due to mental illness. It will undoubtedly relieve him
of any guilt, if he sincerely believed, on the basis of his misrepresenta-
tions, that he was doing right.
I would like to repeat at this point that it is the role of the psychiatrist
to determine the facts on which this responsibility is based; it is the role
of the court to determine guilt.
One cannot emphasize this point too much. The psychiatrist in his
examination is to determine the mental state of the individual and its
relation to his subjective conception of reality and as to whether he was
acting in accord with this concept. But it must be borne in mind as
Judge Thurman Arnold stated in the Holloway case:
1962,1 %
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"Reconciliation between the medical tests of insanity and the
moral tests of criminal responsibility is impossible . . . (because
their) purposes are different .... " Fixing standards of criminal
responsibility is a legal, not a medical problem, and if we adopt
a test based, as it should be, on legal concepts which grow from
our traditional, ethical and moral standards, we need not be con-
cerned about reconciling the two. The expert witness describes
the mental capacity of the accused in his terms and by his scienti-
fic standards and the jury applies to the evidence society's legal
standard in terms of capacity to exercise will and choice and de-
cides whether the accused is to be punished or treated. [Emphasis
supplied. ] 1 6
Too many of us fail to recognize this important fact. It is one of
the most important errors in the Durham Rule. This rule is medically,
not legally oriented. In an attempt to combine the two concepts the result
has been a scramble of words not understandable by either profession.
Judge Burger in the Blocker decision recognizes this problem quite
clearly:
As we tried to cope with the flood of cases and problems arising
out of our 1954 decision, it is plain that this court made a sincere
and maximum effort to render the new test workable. That it is
not workable and ought to be changed is, as suggested, a conse-
quence of its being medically rather than legally oriented and
being cast in language which is vague and confusing in some
respects and restrictive in others. Having adopted a standard of
criminal responsibility with "built in" ambiguities, we virtually
invited "reasonable doubt" in every case where the issue was pre-
sented. The correct direction of Durham was to broaden the
scope of medical inquiry but the incorrect step was to try to do
this in terms which ignore the elements of recognition of wrong-
doing and capacity to control conduct. As has been shown, the
majority of psychiatric writers do not want the jury inquiry
limited to the terms of the medical inquiry.17
Causality and Productivity
A cause is that which positively brings about or produces the ex-
istence of something else. Can we ever say with certainty that in this
sense any criminal offense was caused by mental illness? Or could we
state the contrary with equal certainty, i.e., did the mental illness cause
the crime? Or could we more easily state that because of faulty sub-
jective judgments based on mental illness the individual committed the
offense? This would seem to be true.
What are we to think of the relationship of cause and effect in the
case of a schizophrenic patient who because of an upsurge of his sexual
appetite commits a crime to obtain funds to pay a prostitute? Did the
illness produce the offense in this case?
16 Judge Thurman Arnold, as quoted in Blocker v. United States, supra note 1,
at 868.
'7 Blocker v. United States, supra note 1, at 864-865.
[VoL 45
SYMPOSIUM ON INSANITY
Why do so few schizophrenics commit crimes? Is there not some
other factor to be considered? Is "productivity" a legal or a medical
question? What is so imperfectly spelled out cannot help but confuse a
jury and by the mere fact of being imperfectly defined may be altered
by jury after jury so that there will be no uniformity in the administra-
tion of the law.
Psychiatrists cannot fail to have difficulty in channeling their views
into this narrow passageway. Legal responsibility should not be con-
cerned with such a nebulous relationship. Responsibility should be con-
sidered only with whether the criminal act was intimately interwoven
into the texture of the mental illness and was a predictable outgrowth
of it. Causality too frequently has a doubtful meaning when applied to
psychiatric concepts.
In this area the American Law Institute Rule 8 is not so "either-or"
in its wording. In stating that "substantial capacity" must be present for
responsibility it leaves more room for discussion but eventually in prac-
tice a sharp line must be drawn and this would end with a "yes or no"
answer being required in court for the psychiatrist. This would put it
in the same category as the Durham Rule in demanding an unqualified
answer to a question of cause and effect which can seldom be done.' 9 It
is only fair to say that Drs. Overholser, et al, find little of value in the
A.L.I. Rule:
Specifically, "substantial" and "capacity" are psychologically
vague, ambiguous, unclear and complex quantitative concepts.
More important, "to appreciate the criminality" is an involved
cognitive phrase at least as likely to lead to confusion as "knowl-
edge of right and wrong." Further, since criminality is an illegal
act with an accompanying mental state, is there not a logical in-
consistency or tautology here? For if the offender cannot "appre-
ciate the criminality," then his act is not criminal, and if it is
criminal then he must have "appreciated" it.20
Father Cutler admits that:
Although "productivity" is indeed a feature of the A.L.I. test,
it does not carry with it the fatal ambiguity of the Durham
18The ALI Rule is stated in the following words:
Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility.
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.
(2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct. MODEL
PENAL CODE §4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
'9 Cutler, S.J., Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law, 5 CATHOLIC LAW, 54(1959).
20 Freedman, Guttmacher, and Overholser, Mental Disease or Defect Excluding
Responsibility, 118 Am. J. PsycH. 32-34 (1961).
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product formula, which the Institute studied but rejected as hope-
lessly and dangerously vague.
21
I would now like to speak specifically of the Durham and American
Law Institute Rules.
The Durham Rule and the A.L.I. Rule
Having expressed disagreement with the Durham Rule, it is only
fair to say why I do so.
I would like to preface these remarks with this quotation:
The advocates of the Durham approach often put their critics at
serious disadvantage, for in their facile approach to the approach
to the difficult and complex subject of responsibility, they make
a refutation of Durham appear platitudinous. This is due to the
fact that those of other opinions take their stand on the hard
facts of social protection and the maintenance of the hard core
of legal principles, while the defenders of Durham resort to an
individualistic, more clinical approach with all its personalistic,
emotional overtones. 22
Some of the objections to Durham as I see them are the following:
The terms "disease" and "defect" are inadequately defined. If, as
defined by the Court in Durham, "disease" is a condition which is
capable of improving or getting worse, and a "defect" is a condition
which does not change, then what is left? It is apparent that any disease
will get better, get worse, or remain unchanged. The rule, according to
this definition, would embrace all psychiatric disorders from the mildest
to the most severe. In the absence of a better definition, it leaves the
decision as to what constitutes disease to the expert witness. This, at
best, is unsatisfactory because of the great variance among psychiatrists
of the relationship between mental illness and crime. The Rule is seem-
ingly designed to maximize the opinion of some psychiatrists that all
criminals are mentally ill. It has, in fact, been recommended that soon
the courts will no longer dispense justice but will become Psychiatric
Clinics.
The lack of definition of mental disease in the Durham Rule permits
such incidents has happened in the Leach case when St. Elizabeth's
Hospital decided in the middle of a trial that henceforth the hospital
would consider that patients diagnosed as Sociapathic Personality Dis-
turbance would be considered to have a "mental disease" in terms of
the Durham Decision. However arbitrary and unscientific such an action
might seem, it is compounded when we note that a few days after this
decision, a staff physician of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, testifying in open
court in reply to a question of the presiding judge on whether all the
physicians on the staff of the hospital agreed with the announcement of
21 Cutler, supra note 19, at 54.
22 Cutler, supra note 19, at 49.
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the assistant superintendent, replied in substance that all the staff physi-
cians did not agree but that no one would be sent from the hospital
to testify in such cases unless they did concur. One of the great claims
made for the Durham Rule is that a psychiatrist could testify freely
and in his own frame of reference. What happens to this freedom if the
staff physicians of a hospital are to be allowed to testify in court only
if they agree with the opinion of the superintendent? More than this,
since in the Blocker case the court apparently conceded the power of
St. Elizabeth's Hospital to drastically enlarge the scope of a rule of law
by an arbitrary "week-end" decision would anyone be safe from the
results of similar actions in the hands of an unscrupulous group of
politicians? Lewis seems to recognize this danger when he says:
If crime and disease are to be regarded as the same thing, it
follows that any state of mind which our masters chose to call
"disease" can be treated as crime and compulsorily cured.23
The belief that all criminals are sick people was in the beginning
confined to a small group of psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists.
Even after the concept became more widespread there was some re-
straint on the belief that judges retained the traditional belief of the
criminal law that criminals were responsible for their misdeeds unless
they had a mental illness. When, however, judges begin to believe that
all criminals are mentally ill, we need to take stock. For example, how
else are we to interpret the statement of an appellate judge (which to
date I have not seen contradicted). "I would have thought that repeated
criminal acts might well be the most cogent proof of a mental abnor-
mality." Since all degrees and kinds of mental abnormality are em-
braced by "disease" or "defect" under Durham, what will happen if
both judges and psychiatrists begin to use the "disease-product" rela-
tionship ? When we get beyond a narrow fringe area of "disease-product"
opinion, we are getting into a terra incognita where there are no facts
and only tenuous hypotheses.
Fathers Ford and Kelly point out some of the dangers inherent in
this viewpoint:
But there is an opposite extreme which is still more dangerous
because it promotes a conception of human nature which is basi-
cally false. This is the viewpoint that undermines all human re-
sponsibility by reducing man to a mechanism or making his
conduct the mere product of his instinct or of his unconscious
drives .... There is such a thing as freedom. There is such a
thing as normality. Men do deliberately choose what is wrong
and what is criminal. 24
23 C. S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, THE CATHOLIC MIND,
254-60 (May-June, 1961).
24 Quoted by Cutler, supra note 19, at 59.
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The term "product" used in Durham is misleading. There is no real
evidence that "mental disease" can cause or produce criminal acts. Not
only is this true, but an attempt to establish such a relationship at least
implicitly denies the freedom of the will, a fact upon which all criminal
law is based. Even if we assume for purposes of discussion that there
is a causal relationship between mental illness and a criminal act, would
this mere concomitance excuse the individual of responsibility? I doubt
that it would.
By opening the door so wide, as I have previously mentioned, the
Durham Rule excuses by reason of insanity the "sociopathic personality"
from responsibility for criminal offenses. Not only is this true, but when
the sociopath is sent to a mental hospital in accordance with (Section
24:301 (D) ) of the District of Columbia Code, there is no way to
release such an individual from the hospital because he must be "cured"
before discharge from the hospital, and since there is no effective treat-
ment for the sociopath, he could remain there until death. It must be
emphasized that Sociopathic Personality Disturbance is not a clean-cut,
easily identifiable Disease, but rather a syndrome which may be quite
variable in its manifestations. In the American Law Institute Rule an
attempt is made to correct this glaring defect in Durham by specifically
excluding the condition from the term "mental disease or defect. '25 It
should also be noted that in the Diagnostic Nomenclature of the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association emphasis is made of the fact that the syn-
drome may occur as a symptomatic manifestation of many underlying
disorders.2 6 Diagnostically and prognostically, therefore, all Sociopathic
Personality Disturbances cannot be grouped and described as a definite
entity. One must admit at least differences of degree in the disturbances.
For this reason no general rule can be made in regard to the degree of
illness of these individuals. The only characteristic which they all have
in common is that they are behavior disorders. In the diagnostic nomen-
clature of the American Psychiatric Association there are three sub-
divisions under the classification of Sociopathic Personality Disturbance:
a) Antisocial Reaction
b) Dyssocial Reaction
c) Sexual Deviation
If we are to be logical, then, if we say that Sociopathic Personality
Disorder, Antisocial Personality, is a disease or defect in terms of the
Durham Rule, then should we not also include Sociopathic Personality
Disorder, Sexual Deviation as a disease under the Rule? This diagnosis
25 "The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality mani-
fested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct." MODEL
PENAL CODE§ 54.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).2 6
DIAGNOsTIc NOMIENCLATURE OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AssociATioN 38(1952).
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includes such conditions as homosexuality, transvestitism, pedophilia,
sexual sadism (including rape, sexual assault and mutilation). One
would have little difficulty seeing a causal relationship between pedo-
philia and pederasty. Is this, however, a "disease" which would in all
cases excuse one from punishment? I cannot be convinced of this, but
it seems to be a logical conclusion from the St. Elizabeth's decision in
the Leach case. The American Law Institute Rule attempts to avoid
this difficulty by specifically excluding disorders characterized only by
disturbed behavior. Although the A.L.I. Rule may have certain ad-
vantages over Durham and M'Naghten, I am not sure that in this pro-
vision it does not become diagnostic and invade the area of psychiatric
competence. Ultimately the decision of whether a disorder belongs in
this group is going to depend on the psychiatric examination. It should
probably be left there.
If the psychiatrists in a case all were to agree that the defendant
had a "mental disease" and the act was the product of such a "disease,"
there is not much left for the jury to decide.
The Durham Rule leaves the decision in the case largely up to the
psychiatrists. If there is any doubt about this, reference should be made
to the Douglas opinion in which it is stated that the case is left in the
hands of the jury only if there is disagreement among the psychiatrists
and if the expert testimony supports guilt.27
On the contrary, the suggestion which has been made to have the
psychiatrist testify only to the clinical facts as he sees them and without
any statement of his conclusion for the guidance of the jury is equally
undesirable. Even though the judge instructs them in the rule of
law, it is unlikely that the jury can translate the psychiatric language
into the legal framework offered to them. There must be some transition
from the purely clinical to the purely legal.
To illustrate this point may I present a somewhat lengthy but inter-
esting case report. May I also ask you to imagine yourselves as jurors
listening to this testimony knowing that you will be required to offer
an opinion on the sanity of the individual whose illness is being de-
scribed:
This subject was born and reared in a small country town. He
has been sickly since early youth and has been diagnosed as hav-
ing hyperpituitary and hypogonadal endocrine disturbance. He
tended to be shy with women and preferred the company of men.
He was guided by his feelings in what he said and did because
if his feelings did not support him in his work of fulfilling cer-
tain commitments, he would become at least miserable, if not
depressed. He spoke in a high-pitched, rasping voice and suffered
from diplopia and severe eyestrain, which were increased when
he was fatigued or excited. Under these circumstances he would
27 Blocker v. United States, supra note 1, at 863.
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suffer from headache, nausea, indigestion, and depression. Peri-
odically he would lapse without warning into a state of with-
drawal, during which he was described by his friends as "ugly
and stupid looking," "dull," "sad and detached." He told friends
that he was never without "melancholy."
His mother died when he was nine years of age, and although his
step-mother was kind and devoted, he retained a persistent,
gloomy mother-fixation association with a preoccupation for
melancholy and tragic songs and poetry about the dead and the
past. He was engaged three times. His first fiance died in an
epidemic following which the subject became depressed with a
severe suicidal drive which lasted for months. His second fiance
he could not marry because of a severe revulsion to her. His
third fiance he finally married, but due to an intense depression
he was unable to appear at the wedding ceremony. Following this
he again became depressed, incoherent, and suicidal for several
weeks. These attacks occurred at frequent intervals and persisted
for years.
When his son died, before the body was placed in its coffin, the
subject did a strange thing. Although usually considerate of
others and especially of children, he sent for his son's playmate
to see the life-like appearance wrought by the embalmer. The
boy, who had sat a long time holding the dead boy's hand on
the day he died, had to be carried from the room and was in bed
for days after. When the boy was buried, the subject had it
twice disinterred to look upon it. When a clergyman remon-
strated with the subject that his grief was sinful and unworthy
of a Christian, our subject remained unimpressed until the clergy-
man explained that God was not the God of the dead but of the
living, that his son was alive.
The subject was then reported to have jumped up, exclaiming,
"Alive? Alive?" and indulged in a highly colored, emotional
scene.
28
That is the case. If the psychiatrist stops at this point and gives no
summation, answers no questions which fit his description into a legal
frame of reference, what would the jury decide? What opinion have
you formed?
Perhaps some of you have already recognized that this is a brief
description of the medical history of Abraham Lincoln. He has been
variously diagnosed as being Manic-Depressive, Schizophrenic, or neu-
rotic, any or all of which diagnoses may be wrong, but the important
fact here is that the presence of numerous and severe psychiatric mani-
festations does not always mean irresponsibility. There must be some
interpretation of the psychiatric facts to the jury.
Summary
In conclusion the following principles should be adhered to in any
28 Edward J. Kempf, M.D., Abraham Lincoln's Organic and Emotional Neurosis,
67 ARcHIVEs OF NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 419-33 (1952).
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rules for determining responsibility for conduct in those who are men-
tally ill:
1. The basic tenets of the M'Naghten Rule as properly understood
should be retained. In this test the mentally ill defendant's re-
sponsibility should be determined on the basis not only of his
conceptual cognition, but of his evaluative cognition as well.
2. The "Unresisted urge test," sometimes erroneously known as the
irresistible impulse test, should be retained. Under this test the
individual is considered not responsible when, even if he knows
what is right, he is unable by reason of mental illness to adhere
to this judgment. Properly understood, this concept preserves
the principle of the freedom of the will. Without individual
freedom there is no basis for the criminal law.
3. Since every act is based on a conscious (if erroneous) subjective
judgment, there is no value in introducing the Unconscious to
the jury. The Unconscious undoubtedly influences, but does not
determine the individual's behavior.
4. Psychiatric testimony concerning the patient's mental state should
be unhampered in its presentation to the jury. However, at its
conclusion properly directed questions designed to serve as guide-
posts for the jury in regard to the defendant's responsibility
should be asked.
5. The psychiatrist's opinion must be his own and unhampered by
administrative decision.
6. The principle of individual freedom to act or not to act must be
preserved.
7. The difference between responsibility and guilt must be clearly
understood.
Finally, as for the three rules, my own inclination would be to eliminate
the Durham Rule for the many reasons mentioned above. The American
Law Institute Rule tries to eliminate the defects of Durham, but I be-
lieve falls short of its goal for the same reason that Durham falls short.
Its terms are too difficult to define. Its value is in its effort to clarify
the status of the sociopath. M'Naghten, with all its faults, seems to this
writer the most satisfactory and understandable to both psychiatrists,
judges and juries.
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